In recent weeks, many people in Pakistan have been discussing what they call the “Gen Z revolution†in Bangladesh. Social media is full of comparisons, and there is a growing expectation that Pakistani Gen Z will soon react in a similar way. While such comparisons may sound emotionally appealing, they ignore the deep structural, social, and economic differences between the two countries. I believe that expecting a Bangladesh-like Gen Z uprising in Pakistan reflects an oversimplified understanding of both societies.
A Different Social Fabric
Bangladesh is, to a large extent, an ethnically and linguistically homogeneous society. Nearly 99 % of its population shares the same ethnic roots, cultural identity, and a single official language—Bangla. This homogeneity plays a crucial role in mass mobilization by minimizing internal fault lines. During protests, people largely see themselves as part of one collective “we,†making unified action easier.
Pakistan, in contrast, is a richly diverse country, where Punjabis, Sindhis, Pashtuns, Baloch, Seraikis, and many other groups coexist with mutual respect, each bringing their unique ethnic identities, social distinctions, and political narratives to strengthen a shared sense of social harmony. This diversity is not a weakness; it simply makes achieving national-level consensus more complex and requires greater effort to unite around a single agenda. Although Urdu serves as Pakistan’s lingua franca, it is the native language of only about 9 % of the population. Dozens of regional and provincial languages are spoken across the country, and no single language commands a majority—adding further complexity to collective mobilization.
Class Structure and Economic Reality
Another major difference lies in class structure. Bangladesh’s economy is heavily centered on industrial labor, especially the garment sector. A large segment of the population belongs to a relatively similar working or lower-middle class. This creates shared economic pressures and common demands, such as wages, working conditions, and job security. When Gen Z reacts there, it often reacts as part of a broader working-class ecosystem.
Pakistan’s economy is structurally different, combining a strong feudal and semi-feudal character in rural areas—shaped by large landholdings, agricultural income, and landlord–tenant relationships—with urban activity in industry, services, and commerce, forming a complex mix that gives rise to diverse political power centers. Alongside this, there is a sharp divide between urban elites, the middle class, labor class, and rural populations. Pakistani Gen Z itself is split across these class realities. A young entrepreneur in Lahore/Karachi, a young agricultural worker in interior Sindh, and a young coal mine worker in Balochistan do not experience the state or the economy in the same way. This creates a gap between digital activism and real-world mobilization.
 The population Density Factor
Another structural factor that distinguishes Bangladesh from Pakistan is population density, both nationally and within major cities. Bangladesh is one of the most densely populated country in the world, with over 3,400 people per square mile — more than three times Pakistan’s overall density. This concentration is even more pronounced in megacities like Dhaka (World most populated city), home to tens of millions in tightly packed urban space, which facilitates rapid spread of ideas and organized action.
- In high-density cities (Like Bangladesh), social ideas and collective action spread faster because people live close together, commute together, and share infrastructure — increasing interaction and shared grievances.
- In lower density urban or mixed rural/urban societies, (like Pakistan’s), people are spread out — making communication, protest logistics, and mobilization harder on a large scale.
Generational Continuity and the Illusion of Exclusion
One critical misunderstanding within contemporary Gen Z discourse is the belief that generations exist in isolation. In reality, yesterday’s Gen Z inevitably becomes today’s so-called boomers. Generational labels change, but society remains continuous. Every household in Pakistan contains multiple generations living side by side. Gen Z does not live in a vacuum; parents, elders, and older professionals shape social, economic, and political life. Excluding boomers from the national conversation is neither practical nor wise. The same lesson applies looking forward: just as Gen Z might dismiss boomers today, Gen Alpha may one day dismiss Gen Z. Sustainable change in Pakistan requires intergenerational cooperation, not generational hostility.
From Flood to Dam: The Question of Direction
Gen Z today resembles boundary-less floodwater—immensely powerful, emotional, and energetic. Floodwater can destroy, but it rarely produces lasting benefit on its own. When that same water is channeled into a dam, it generates energy, stability, and long-term value. Organization, discipline, and institutional engagement are what transform raw force into productive power.
This also requires patience. A generation cannot spend its entire lifespan on highways waiting for a sudden revolution. Protest has its place, but a permanent politics of disruption exhausts both society and the movement itself. Real influence comes when Gen Z enters institutions—education, professions, bureaucracy, politics, media, and civil society—and reshapes them from within.
 Internal Flaws Within Pakistani Gen Z Discourse
Beyond structural constraints, there are also ideological and behavioral weaknesses within sections of Pakistani Gen Z that limit their effectiveness.
The first major flaw is a sense of absolute moral certainty. Many young voices operate with the belief that they alone are on the right path, and that anyone who disagrees with them is automatically anti-Pakistan or part of the problem. This mindset shuts down dialogue and converts political disagreement into moral hostility.
The second flaw is the inability to listen. Much of Gen Z activism is loud, expressive, and emotionally charged, but one-directional. Speaking without listening alienates older generations, working classes, and even potential allies. Influence is not built by volume; it is built by understanding how others think, fear, and prioritize.
The third flaw is lack of adaptability. Effective political actors transform themselves according to circumstances. Pakistani Gen Z often tries to apply one rigid narrative everywhere, regardless of audience, class, or region.
A useful analogy is the electricity system itself. Power is generated/transmitted at very high voltage—11 kV or more—but before entering homes, it is stepped down to 220 volts. Without this transformation, electricity would destroy what it is meant to serve. In the same way, ideas generated with high emotional and ideological voltage must be transformed into accessible, practical, and culturally compatible forms before reaching ordinary households. Otherwise, they repel rather than empower.
Conclusion
Pakistan’s social diversity, class structure, and demographic dynamics make sudden, unified youth revolutions unlikely. The country’s own political history reinforces the same lesson: sustainable change in Pakistan comes not from colliding with the system, but from navigating, reshaping, and gradually reforming it from within.
Understanding this reality does not weaken Gen Z; it equips it with the strategic clarity needed to make a lasting impact.
So what does Pakistan really need from Gen Z: directionless activity, or productive action with sustainable achievement?
