In recent weeks, many people in Pakistan have been discussing what they call the “Gen Z revolution” in Bangladesh. Social media is full of comparisons, and there is a growing expectation that Pakistani Gen Z will soon react in a similar way. While such comparisons may sound emotionally appealing, they ignore the deep structural, social, and economic differences between the two countries. I believe that expecting a Bangladesh-like Gen Z uprising in Pakistan reflects an oversimplified understanding of both societies.
A Different Social Fabric
Bangladesh is, to a large extent, an ethnically and linguistically homogeneous society. Nearly 99 % of its population shares the same ethnic roots, cultural identity, and a single official language—Bangla. This homogeneity plays a crucial role in mass mobilization by minimizing internal fault lines. During public mobilization for any cause, people largely see themselves as part of one collective “we,” making unified action easier.
Pakistan, in contrast, is a richly diverse country, where Punjabis, Sindhis, Pashtuns, Baloch, Seraikis, and many other groups coexist with mutual respect, each bringing their unique ethnic identities, social distinctions, and political narratives to strengthen a shared sense of social harmony. This diversity is not a weakness; it simply makes achieving national-level consensus more complex and requires greater effort to unite around a single agenda. Although Urdu serves as Pakistan’s lingua franca, it is the native language of only about 9% of the population. The country’s linguistic landscape is instead distributed across several major regional/local languages—Punjabi (37%), Pashto (18%), Sindhi (14%), Saraiki (12%), along with Balochi, Hindko, Brahui, and others—meaning no single language is spoken by a clear majority. This deep linguistic plurality reinforces ethnic identities and makes nationwide mobilization around a single narrative inherently complex.
Class Structure and Economic Reality
Another major difference lies in class structure. Bangladesh’s economy is heavily centered on industrial labor, especially the garment sector. A large segment of the population belongs to a relatively similar working or lower-middle class specially in urban centers. This creates shared economic pressures and common demands, such as wages, working conditions, unemployment and job security. When Gen Z reacts there, it often reacts as part of a broader working-class ecosystem.
Pakistan’s economy is structurally different, combining a strong feudal and semi-feudal character in rural areas—shaped by large landholdings, agricultural income, and landlord–tenant relationships—with urban activity in industry, services, and commerce, forming a complex mix that gives rise to diverse political power centers. Alongside this, there is a sharp divide between urban elites, the middle class, labor class, and rural populations. Pakistani Gen Z itself is split across these class realities. A young entrepreneur in Lahore/Karachi, a young agricultural worker in interior Sindh, and a young coal mine worker in Balochistan do not experience the state or the economy in the same way. This creates a gap between digital activism and real-world mobilization.
The population Density Factor
Another structural factor that distinguishes Bangladesh from Pakistan is population density, both nationally and within major cities. Bangladesh is one of the most densely populated country in the world, with over 3,400 people per square mile — more than three times Pakistan’s overall density. This concentration is even more pronounced in megacities like Dhaka (World most populated city), home to tens of millions in tightly packed urban space, which facilitates rapid spread of ideas and organized action.
High-Density Urban Mobilization (Like Bangladesh), social ideas and collective action spread faster because people live close together, commute together, and share infrastructure — increasing interaction and shared grievances.
Low-Density and Fragmented Mobilization (like Pakistan’s), people are spread out — making communication, protest logistics, and mobilization harder on a large scale.
Conclusion
Pakistan’s social diversity, class structure, and demographic dynamics make sudden, unified youth revolutions unlikely. The country’s own political history reinforces the same lesson: sustainable change in Pakistan comes not from colliding with the system, but from navigating, reshaping, and gradually reforming it from within.
Understanding this reality does not weaken Gen Z; it equips it with the strategic clarity needed to make a lasting impact.
